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KENTUCKY SHOULD HAVE CHANGED THE GAME IN NORTH 
DAKOTA, BUT DID NOT 
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“The U.S. Government expects to deport a record number of people 
this year . . . . [Homeland Security will focus on deporting] more convicted 
criminals, recent border-crossers, egregious immigration law violators and 
immigration fugitives . . . .”1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2010, in Padilla v. Kentucky,2 the United States Supreme 
Court dramatically altered the constitutional duties of criminal defense 
lawyers in holding the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to accurately and 
affirmatively advise a client of adverse immigration consequences like 
deportation.  The reasoning the Court utilized in Padilla, however, has the 
promise of a much broader impact.  Padilla paves the way for courts to 
require counsel to accurately advise clients concerning reasonably fore-
seeable consequences flowing from a criminal conviction during the course 
of the representation.  In other words, Padilla is a shot across the bow for 
defense attorneys.  Counsel can no longer afford to ignore consequences 
that would be important to the client simply because the consequence is 
collateral to the criminal case. 
When other consequences of a criminal conviction are subjected to a 
careful analysis using the factors outlined in Padilla, counsel can and 
should have an affirmative duty to investigate, explain, and advise clients 
about these consequences.  Courts around the country have applied Padilla 
to a number of consequences outside of the immigration law context, 
including misadvice about whether the client would be subject to civil 
commitment as a sexually violent predator,3 misadvice concerning whether 
a no-contest plea would prohibit a subsequent challenge to the elements of 
the crime in a civil lawsuit arising from the criminal conduct,4 counsel’s 
failure to advise a defendant of the requirement to register as a sexual 
offender,5 misadvice concerning the applicability of a parole eligibility 
 
2. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
3. Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010).  But see Brown v. 
Goodwin, No. 09-211, 2010 WL 1930574, at *13 (D.N.J. May 11, 2010) (declining to extend 
Padilla to advice concerning civil commitment as a sexually violent predator). 
4. Wilson v. State, 244 P.3d 535, 539 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010). 
5. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).  But see Maxwell v. 
Larkins, No. 4:08 CV 1896 DDN, 2010 WL 2680333, at *10 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2010) (declining to 
extend Padilla to sex offender registration). 
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requirement,6 and counsel’s failure to advise the defendant of the automatic 
forfeiture of a teacher’s pension as a result of a guilty plea to a sex crime 
that occurred within the scope of his employment.7  However, recent 
indications from North Dakota courts indicate a strong reluctance to 
abandon the traditional pre-Padilla collateral consequences doctrine.8 
This article advocates for a broad application of Padilla to all 
reasonably foreseeable consequences likely to flow from a criminal 
conviction, such as immigration, sex offender registration, civil forfeiture, 
civil commitment, application of parole eligibility statutes, loss of the right 
to own or possess firearms, loss of public benefits such as housing 
assistance, and loss of professional licensure.  The list of collateral conse-
quences keeps growing, which means the obligations of defense counsel 
keep expanding.  Padilla is the roadmap, but now we must convince North 
Dakota courts to follow it.  Even if North Dakota courts decline the invi-
tation, I suggest counsel practice above the bar that the courts seem reticent 
to raise. 
This article outlines how Padilla has changed the landscape for 
criminal defense attorneys.  The second section details the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Padilla and it includes a discussion of the facts, the majority’s 
reasoning and holding, the concurrence’s reasoning, and a discussion of the 
dissenters’ position.  The third section outlines how Padilla impacts North 
Dakota criminal defense practice.  Specifically, it includes a discussion of 
the prevailing professional norms in North Dakota, Padilla’s abrogation of 
three North Dakota cases, a table of North Dakota crimes with “clear-ish” 
immigration consequences, counsel’s potential duty to advise clients of 
other reasonably foreseeable consequences flowing from a criminal 
conviction, and a discussion of North Dakota cases involving other 
consequences since Padilla was decided. 
 
6. See generally Pridham v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-CA-002190-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 
19, 2010), http://apps.courts ky.gov/supreme/sc_opinions.shtm (applying Padilla’s reasoning to 
gross misadvice concerning the application of a parole eligibility requirement).  The court of 
appeals noted “the factors relied upon in the deportation context apply with equal vigor to the 
circumstances of gross misadvice about parole eligibility.  Parole eligibility involves a 
foreseeable, material consequence of the guilty plea that is ‘intimately related to the criminal 
process’ and is an ‘automatic result’ following certain criminal convictions.”  Id. at 5-6 (quoting 
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478, 1486). 
7. Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090, 1094-95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010). 
8. See Interest of L.T., 2011 ND 120, ¶¶ 20-22, 798 N.W.2d 657, 663 (declining to require 
the court to advise the child or respondent-parent of the requirement to register as a sexual 
offender before accepting an admission of guilt to an offense requiring the juvenile to register); 
see also Order Denying Motion to Amend Sentence at 3, State v. Richardson, No: 09-2011-CR-
00156 (N.D. Dist. Ct. July 18, 2011) (declining any requirement of court or the defendant’s 
counsel to advise the defendant of the requirement to register as a sex offender). 
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II. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 
A. FACTS 
Jose Padilla was born in Honduras.9  He immigrated to the United 
States in the 1960s and became a lawful permanent resident.10  Padilla also 
served in the United States military during the Vietnam War and received 
an honorable discharge.11  In September 2001, Padilla, a commercial truck 
driver, was indicted in Kentucky for misdemeanor possession of marijuana, 
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, felony trafficking of 
marijuana, and failing to have a weight and distance tax number on his 
semi-truck.12  Authorities found more than a thousand pounds of marijuana 
in the tractor-trailer of his semi-truck.13 
Padilla pleaded not guilty to all counts and was released on bond.14  
Shortly after his release, the Immigration and Naturalization Service lodged 
an immigration detainer against him to investigate his immigration status.15  
Based on the detainer, the trial court revoked his bond, apparently believing 
he was an illegal alien.16 
Padilla remained in pretrial confinement for almost a year despite his 
lawful permanent resident status.17  Padilla then pleaded guilty to the 
misdemeanor drug and paraphernalia possession and felony marijuana 
trafficking counts.18  The felony trafficking count involved the transport-
tation of five or more pounds of marijuana.19  The citation for the weight 
and distance tax number violation was dismissed.20  The felony drug traf-
ficking count was considered a deportable, aggravated felony offense under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act.21  Padilla’s plea agreement recom-
 
9. Brief for Petitioner at 8, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651). 
10. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010). 
11. Id. 
12. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008). 
13. Brief for Respondent at 3, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651). 
14. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 10, at 8. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 8-9. 
18. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008). 
19. Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 4; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
218A.1421(1), 218A.1421(4)(a), 532.050(2)(c) (West 2006) (providing the state’s operative 
criminal statute, gradation statute, and penalty statute). 
20. See Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483 (noting that Padilla pled guilty to the drug related charges 
and the remaining count was dismissed). 
21. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 n.1 (2010); see also 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (“Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a 
violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United 
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 
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mended a sentence of ten years, first to serve five years with the balance 
suspended for five years of probation.22  The court accepted Padilla’s plea 
and sentenced him accordingly on October 4, 2002.23 
B. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
On August 18, 2004, almost at the end of his prison sentence, Padilla 
filed a pro se post-conviction relief petition.24  Padilla alleged his counsel 
told him that he “did not have to worry about [his] immigration status since 
he had been in the country so long.”25 His petition also asserted his 
attorney’s incorrect advice induced him to plead guilty,26 and Padilla 
claimed his attorney was ineffective in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
rights when he provided him with incorrect advice concerning the immi-
gration consequences of his pleas.27 
The trial court denied Padilla’s post-conviction relief petition without 
an evidentiary hearing, noting a valid guilty plea does not require the 
defendant to be advised of every possible consequence before the 
acceptance of the plea.28  The trial court further noted “Padilla’s counsel 
does not make a deportation decision and neither does this Court.”29 
Padilla appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.30  The court of 
appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for an 
evidentiary hearing, reasoning that while immigration was a collateral 
consequence outside of the scope of the Sixth Amendment, “an affirmative 
act of ‘gross misadvice’ relating to collateral matters can justify post-
conviction relief.”31 
The Commonwealth of Kentucky sought discretionary review from its 
supreme court.32  The Kentucky Supreme Court reasoned immigration 
 
21), other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana, is deportable.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (“The term ‘aggravated felony’ 
means . . . illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21), 
including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18).”). 
22. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. 
23. See id.; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 10, at 9.  Padilla was given credit for the 
365 days he spent in custody before the date of sentencing. 
24. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. 
25. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (quoting Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483). 
26. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 484. 
27. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
28. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 10, at 12. 
29. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 483-84. 
32. Id. at 483. 
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concerns were collateral to the criminal case.33  Because immigration was 
collateral to the criminal case, the court further determined: 
As collateral consequences are outside the scope of the guarantee 
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it follows that counsel’s 
failure to advise [Padilla] of such collateral issue or his act of 
advising [Padilla] incorrectly provides no basis for relief.  In 
neither instance is the matter required to be addressed by counsel, 
and so an attorney’s failure in that regard cannot constitute 
ineffectiveness entitling a criminal defendant to relief 
under Strickland v. Washington.34 
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed its court of appeals and reinstated 
the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief.35 
Padilla filed a petition for rehearing, which was summarily denied.36  
Padilla then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.37  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari38 “to decide whether, as a matter of federal law, 
Padilla’s counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which 
he was pleading guilty would result in his removal from the country.”39  
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding the traditional distinction between 
direct and collateral consequences was inapplicable with respect to harsh 
immigration consequences like deportation40 and that constitutionally 
competent counsel would have correctly advised Padilla of the mandatory 
deportation consequences associated with his guilty pleas to the drug traf-
ficking count.41  The Supreme Court did not address the prejudice prong of 
Strickland, whether Padilla would not have pled guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial but for the errors of counsel.42  The Supreme Court 
reversed the Kentucky Supreme Court and remanded the matter for a deter-
mination of whether Padilla can satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong.43 
 
33. See id. 
34. Id. at 485. 
35. Id. 
36. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-
651). 
37. Id. 
38. Padilla v. Kentucky, 129 S. Ct. 1317, 1317 (2009) (granting certiorari). 
39. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
40. Id. at 1482. 
41. Id. at 1487-88 (Alito, J., concurring). 
42. Id. at 1492. 
43. Id. at 1487 (majority opinion). 
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C. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, was joined by 
Justices Kennedy, Ginsberg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.44  The Court held the 
Sixth Amendment generally requires counsel to provide affirmative advice 
concerning the potential risks of deportation as a result of the criminal 
case.45 
1. Holding 
For criminal defense counsel to satisfy Strickland’s objective perfor-
mance prong, counsel must provide accurate, competent advice concerning 
the immigration consequences flowing from a criminal conviction when 
those consequences are clear.46  When the immigration consequences are 
not clear, defense counsel must inform the client that there may be 
immigration consequences and should advise the client to seek advice from 
an immigration attorney.47  Misadvice and silence concerning immigration 
consequences falls below the objective standard of reasonableness for 
counsel’s performance.48 
2. Reasoning 
The majority supported its holding in a number of ways.  First, the 
Court explained the historical developments of the intersection between 
immigration and criminal law.49  Second, the Court determined the 
traditional distinction between direct and collateral consequences is 
inapplicable in light of the enmeshed nature and severity of immigration 
consequences.50  Third, the Court applied the Strickland v. Washington51 
analytical framework to Padilla’s situation, assuming in light of the proce-
dural posture of the case that Padilla’s assertions are factually true.52  
Fourth, the Court addressed what would constitute an objectively 
reasonable performance concerning advice about immigration conse-
quences.53  Fifth, the Court addressed and discarded the floodgates concern 
of allowing defendants to challenge guilty pleas based on inadequate advice 
 
44. Id. at 1477. 
45. See id. 
46. Id. at 1483. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 1483-85. 
49. Id. at 1478-80. 
50. Id. at 1482. 
51. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
52. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480-82. 
53. Id. at 1484-86. 
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concerning immigration consequences.54  Finally, the Court noted the consi-
deration of immigration consequences in the criminal process would benefit 
the criminal justice system as a whole.55 
a. Historical Developments 
Over the last ninety years, federal immigration law has drastically 
changed.56  In its infancy, there were relatively few, narrow classes of 
criminal offenses that would result in deportation.57  Moreover, the Court 
noted judges had wide discretion to avoid deportation consequences.58 
In 1917, with the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act, law 
significantly changed.59  The Act declared wide classes of noncitizens 
deportable for committing crimes or other acts in the United States.60  
Specifically, felons,61 those who commit crimes involving moral turpitude 
within five years of their entry into the United States or those who commit 
more than two crimes involving moral turpitude at any time after entry, 
were declared “deportable.”62  While the Act declared a broad number of 
noncitizens deportable, it also gave judges the ability to recommend against 
deportation.63  Thus, while there were wide categories of “deportable” 
offenses, judges were given the discretion to prevent deportation in unjust 
circumstances.64 
Congress, however, eliminated the ability of sentencing judges to 
recommend against deportation proceedings.65  “In 1996, Congress also 
eliminated the Attorney General’s authority to grant discretionary relief 
from deportation . . . an authority that had been exercised to prevent the 
 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 1486. 
56. Id. at 1478. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 1478-79. 
60. Id. at 1479. 
61. Note that the Act defined “felons” differently than at common law.  That is, the Act 
declared those sentenced to a “year or more” as felons, whereas the traditional definition of felony 
was an offense punishable by more than a year, or one year and one day.  Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006); see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 694 (9th ed. 2009) 
(defining felony as “[a] serious crime usually punishable by imprisonment for more than one year 
or by death”). 
62. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1479. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1480 (“[t]he [Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation] procedure is no 
longer part of our law.  Congress first circumscribed the . . . provision in the 1952 Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA), and in 1990 Congress entirely eliminated it . . . .”). 
          
94 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:85 
deportation of over 10,000 noncitizens during the [five]-year period prior to 
1996 . . . .”66 
b. Inapplicability of Direct/Collateral  
Consequences Distinction 
The Supreme Court has never distinguished between “direct” and 
“collateral” consequences of a criminal conviction when considering the 
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.67  Because depor-
tation is a particularly severe penalty that is “intimately related” and 
“enmeshed” with the criminal process,68 the Court held that clear 
immigration consequences are within the range of information a defense 
attorney must communicate in order to provide objectively reasonable 
representation.69 
The Court traced the history of deportation consequences from past 
immigration law, which left deportation largely to the discretion of judges, 
to current immigration law, which leaves little to no room for judicial 
discretion.70  In other words, the majority of the Court was very concerned 
that deportation has largely become an automatic result for noncitizens 
convicted of certain offenses.71  The Court used this shift as evidence that 
the stakes of a criminal conviction for noncitizens have dramatically risen.72  
Thus, as the Court noted, “deportation is an integral part—indeed, 
sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on 
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”73 
c. Applying Strickland to Advice Concerning  
Immigration Consequences 
Because the Court decided advice regarding immigration consequences 
falls within the “ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,” it applied 
the Strickland framework to Padilla’s claim.74  The two-prong Strickland 
 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 1481. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 1483. 
70. See id. at 1478-80. 
71. See id. at 1480. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 1482.  The Court did not address both prongs of the Strickland test in Padilla’s 
case.  After concluding Padilla’s counsel was objectively deficient, the Court determined the 
Kentucky courts did not address Strickland’s second, “prejudice” prong.  Id. at 1483-84.  The 
Court remanded the case for a determination of whether Padilla was prejudiced by his counsel’s 
deficient performance.  Id. 
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test asks first whether counsel’s performance “fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.”75 The attorney’s performance is measured con-
sidering the prevailing professional norms without the benefit of 
hindsight.76  If the representation was objectively unreasonable, the court 
must then ask “whether ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.’”77  In guilty plea situations, the prejudice prong can be 
satisfied when there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty and insisted on going to 
trial.78 
Applying Strickland to Padilla’s case, the Court first turned to pre-
vailing professional norms of practice.79  The Court reasoned that the 
American Bar Association and other professional organizations’ practice 
standards are guides to determining reasonable attorney performance.80  
The Court specifically recognized standards promulgated by the American 
Bar Association, National Legal Aid and Defender Association, and the 
Department of Justice’s Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense 
Systems, Standards for Attorney Performance.81  Based on these resources, 
the Court found “[t]he weight of prevailing professional norms supports the 
view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of 
deportation.”82 
In Padilla’s case, the Court noted that the deportation consequences 
were succinct, clear, and explicit.83  In the majority’s opinion, Padilla’s 
counsel could have easily determined deportation was essentially manda-
tory by just looking to 8 U.S.C. § 1227, relating to which crimes are 
deportable.84  The Court had no trouble determining that Padilla’s counsel 
was constitutionally deficient.85 
 
75. Id. at 1482 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
76. See id. 
77. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
78. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 
79. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
80. Id. at 1482-83. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 1482. 
83. Id. at 1483. 
84. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (“Any alien who at any time after 
admission has been convicted of a violation of (or an conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or 
regulation . . . relating to a controlled substance . . . other than a single offense involving the 
possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable”)). 
85. Id. 
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d. The Reasonableness of Counsel’s Performance 
In analyzing Padilla’s claim, the Court provided some insight into what 
constitutes “reasonable” performance of counsel with respect to giving 
immigration advice in criminal matters.  Specifically, the Court analyzed 
four situations: (1) counsel’s misadvice; (2) counsel’s silence on 
immigration matters; (3) the duty to advise clients of immigration conse-
quences when the immigration consequences are clear; and (4) the duty to 
advise clients of immigration consequences that are unclear.  Ultimately, 
the Court held that for counsel to be constitutionally competent, he or she 
must provide accurate advice concerning the immigration consequences 
flowing from a criminal conviction when those consequences are clear.86  
When the immigration consequences are not clear, defense counsel must 
inform the client that there may be immigration consequences and should 
advise the client to seek advice from an immigration attorney.87  Misadvice 
and silence concerning immigration consequences falls below the objective 
standard of reasonableness for counsel’s performance.  Each of these situ-
ations is analyzed further below. 
i. Misadvice 
Under Strickland, the attorney’s inaccurate advice to Padilla was 
clearly deficient.88  The Court reasoned “Padilla’s counsel could have easily 
determined that his plea would make him eligible for deportation simply 
from reading the test of the statute . . . .”89  The statute specifically requires 
removal for all drug offense convictions except for those involving simple 
possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana.90  Instead of providing 
him accurate legal advice concerning the mandatory nature of removal if 
Padilla was convicted of trafficking marijuana, Padilla’s counsel provided 
him false assurances that he would not be deported if he pled guilty.91  The 
Court held “[t]his is not a hard case in which to find deficiency:  The conse-






90. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (“Any alien who at any time after admission has 
been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a 
State, the United States or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . other than a 
single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is 
deportable.”). 
91. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483. 
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removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his 
counsel’s advice was incorrect.”92 
Next, the Court addressed the Solicitor General’s position that the 
Sixth Amendment should only cover counsel’s misadvice.93  That is, the 
Solicitor General argued “‘counsel is not constitutionally required to 
provide advice on matters that will not be decided in the criminal case . . . ,’ 
though counsel is required to provide accurate advice if she chooses to 
discuss these matters.”94  After determining misadvice is constitutionally 
deficient, the Court rejected the Solicitor General’s argument, reasoning 
that a constitutional rule limiting the effective assistance of counsel to situ-
ations where counsel provides misadvice would lead to two absurd results.95 
First, counsel would then have an incentive to remain silent and choose 
not to advise clients on extraordinarily important matters.96  The Court 
noted a client must be made aware of the advantages and disadvantages of a 
plea agreement.97  Second, the Court reasoned the Solicitor General’s 
position would deny clients least able to represent themselves even rudi-
mentary advice concerning immigration consequences, even when that 
advice can be readily obtained.98  The Court believed noncitizen defendants 
are likely to be indigent and have no way to hire private immigration 
counsel.99  In other words, noncitizen clients deserve some advice con-
cerning how a criminal conviction will impact their status in the United 
States.100 
ii. Silence 
The Court did not stop when it determined misadvice is constitutionally 
deficient performance, satisfying the first prong of the Strickland test for 
ineffective assistance of counsel.101  The Court next held defense counsel’s 
silence concerning immigration penalties is also constitutionally 
deficient.102  Specifically, the Court reasoned there was no functional 
 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 1484. 
94. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10, 
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651)). 
95. Id. 
96. Id.  
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. See id. 
100. See id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
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difference between providing misadvice and “‘an act of omission’ in this 
context.”103  The Court stated: 
Silence under these circumstances would be fundamentally at odds 
with the critical obligation of counsel to advise the client of the 
advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement.  When 
attorneys know that their clients face possible exile from this 
country and separation from their families, they should not be 
encouraged to say nothing at all.104 
Silence and misadvice are constitutionally deficient, which means there 
is some affirmative duty to advise a client of immigration consequences.  
The question, however, becomes how much and what kind of advice is 
required for counsel to be found constitutionally effective. 
iii. The Affirmative Duty to Advise Client of “Clear” 
Immigration Consequences 
In situations where the immigration consequences are “succinct, clear, 
and explicit,” counsel has an affirmative duty to correctly and competently 
advise clients of the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction.105  
The Court explained that Padilla’s counsel could have easily determined 
Padilla was removable by merely looking to the statute.106  The statute in 
question was not broad or confusing; it reads in pertinent part: 
Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a 
violation of (or conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or 
regulation . . . relating to a controlled substance . . . , other than a 
single offense involving possession for one’s own use of [thirty] 
grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.107 
Having concluded counsel has an affirmative duty to provide accurate, 
competent advice about immigration consequences when those conse-
quences are clear, the Court then addressed what advice defense counsel 




104. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
105. Id. at 1483. 
106. Id. 
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006). 
108. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
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iv. The Affirmative Duty to Advise Client of “Unclear” 
Immigration Consequences 
Not all immigration statutes are clear.109  In fact, the Court recognized 
immigration law can be a very complex legal specialty.110  The Court 
further acknowledged criminal defense lawyers may not be well-versed in 
immigration law.111  Thus, where the law is not succinct and clear, a 
criminal defense attorney must “advise a noncitizen client that pending 
criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences” 
such as deportation.112  In the case of unclear immigration concerns, the 
Court noted the scope and nature of a criminal defense attorney’s advice 
would be limited, which implicitly suggests the client should seek counsel 
from an immigration attorney.113 
e. Addressing the Floodgates Concern 
Finally, the Court addressed the “floodgates” concern that expanding 
Strickland to apply to consideration of immigration consequences would 
substantially affect the finality of criminal convictions obtained via guilty 
pleas.114  The Court noted a similar argument was addressed and discarded 
in Hill v. Lockhart,115 which expanded Strickland and opened the door to 
challenging guilty pleas with ineffective assistance of counsel claims.116  
However, because there was not a flood of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims after Hill, the Court reasoned it is not likely a flood of claims will 
result from the Court’s decision in Padilla.117  The Court further reasoned 
this situation was unlikely to result in a flood of post-conviction relief 
petitions because the nature of the relief—the withdrawal of a guilty plea 
and proceeding to trial—carries with it its own limiting principle: 
defendants “who collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the 
bargain obtained as a result the plea.”118  Consequently, the Court discarded 





112. Id.  
113. See id. at 1483 n.10. 
114. Id. at 1484. 
115. 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
116. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484-85; see also Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-60. 
117. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
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f. Informed Consideration of Immigration Consequences 
Importantly, the Court noted the consideration of immigration conse-
quences is not just for defense counsel.120  The Court suggested both 
prosecutors and defense counsel should know about the potential and likely 
consequences and use them in the plea bargaining process.121  The Court 
explained that “informed consideration of possible deportation can only 
benefit both the State and noncitizen defendants during the plea-bargaining 
process.”122  Justice Stevens argued that by bringing immigration conse-
quences into the discussion, the parties could reach creative plea agree-
ments “that better satisfy the interests of both parties.”123  Therefore, in the 
Court’s view, an up-front, open discussion of immigration consequences in 
plea negotiations is a proper and appropriate consideration for both parties 
in a criminal case.124 
D. THE CONCURRING OPINION 
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts concurred with the majority, but 
wrote separately to address specific concerns with the majority’s opinion.125  
First, the concurrence would limit the extension of the Sixth Amendment to 
situations like Padilla’s involving misadvice and would merely require 
counsel to inform noncitizens that there may be adverse immigration conse-
quences flowing from a conviction.126  The concurrence advocates for a 
bright-line rule, stating a defense attorney must “(1) refrain from 
unreasonably providing incorrect advice and (2) advise the defendant that a 
criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences and that, 
if the alien wants advice on this issue, the alien should consult an immi-
gration attorney.”127  The concurrence believes the majority’s distinction 
between “clear” and “unclear” consequences is confusing, which will result 
in needless litigation and require defense attorneys to wade far into a field 
in which they have little expertise.128 
 




124. See id. 
125. See id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. See id. 
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1. The Collateral Consequences Rule Serves Valid Purposes 
The concurrence began with a discussion of the distinction between 
direct and collateral consequences of a criminal plea.129  Justice Alito noted 
the longstanding distinction required counsel only to advise clients 
concerning the direct consequences of a criminal conviction, not collateral 
consequences.130  Within the discussion, the concurrence also implied 
immigration is a collateral consequence, one that need not specifically be 
discussed by reasonably competent defense counsel.131 
Alito reasoned the purpose of the collateral consequences rule is 
important for one overriding reason: 
Criminal defense attorneys have expertise regarding the conduct of 
criminal proceedings.  They are not expected to possess—and very 
often do not possess—expertise in other areas of the law, and it is 
unrealistic to expect them to provide expert advice on matters that 
lie outside their area of training and experience.132 
The concurrence implies there may be a slippery slope concerning what 
advice defense counsel must give to his or her client.133  That is, 
immigration consequences are but one serious, enmeshed consequence of a 
criminal case.134  There are other important consequences of a criminal con-
viction that might include registration as a sexual offender or offender 
against children, administrative driver’s license consequences, civil com-
mitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from 
public benefits, ineligibility to possess a firearm, dishonorable or negative 
discharge from the Armed Forces, or the loss of a business or professional 
license.135  Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts would reaffirm the 
collateral consequences rule, and would only hold counsel’s performance 




131. See id. (stating an “ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails if ‘based on an 
attorney’s failure to advise a client of his plea’s immigration consequences’”) (quoting United 
States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 2000)); United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 355 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (holding that “an attorney’s failure to advise a client that deportation is a possible 
consequence of a guilty plea does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel”).  See generally 
Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of 
Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699 (2002) (noting that virtually all jurisdictions, 
including “eleven federal circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of Columbia[, hold] that 
lawyers need not explain collateral consequences” of a conviction, including deportation, to their 
clients). 
132. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487-88 (Alito, J., concurring). 
133. See id. at 1488. 
134. See id. 
135. Id. 
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warn the client that the client should seek an expert in that particular area of 
the law.136 
2. Limiting the Application of the Sixth Amendment to 
Affirmative Misadvice and Silence 
The concurrence would have held the Sixth Amendment only prohibits 
misadvice and silence concerning immigration consequences, and Justice 
Alito and Chief Justice Roberts supported the limitation by stating 
“thorough understanding of the intricacies of immigration law is not ‘within 
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’”137  
Competent attorneys would also not “hold themselves out as authorities on 
a difficult and complicated subject matter with which they are not 
familiar.”138  The concurrence agreed with Justice Bill Cunningham, the 
dissenting judge from the Kentucky Supreme Court when he wrote, “I do 
not believe it is too much of a burden to place on our defense bar the duty to 
say, ‘I do not know.’”139 
Additionally, the concurrence reasoned incompetent advice distorts the 
defendant’s ability to make rational decisions.140  The advice may induce 
the defendant to take a deal that he otherwise would not have, such as the 
plea deal Padilla took unaware of the potential for deportation.141  The con-
currence reasoned that limiting the application of the Sixth Amendment to 
affirmative misadvice and silence would not obstruct or frustrate  other 
ways of providing noncitizens competent advice about the immigration 
consequences of criminal conviction.142  Indeed, Justice Alito argued the 
limitation would encourage noncitizens to seek advice about immigration 
consequences from immigration attorneys with a specialized knowledge 
base concerning a complex legal specialty.143  The concurrence does not, 
however, address the majority’s concern that many indigent noncitizens 
will go without advice about immigration consequences because they 
cannot afford to hire a separate attorney. 
Alito points out that deportation is just one of many consequences of 
being convicted of crime.144  Other issues which he noted include “civil 
 
136. Id. at 1494. 
137. Id. at 1492 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 1493 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Cunningham, J., 
dissenting)). 
140. Id. 
141. See id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 1494. 
144. Id. at 1488. 
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commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disqualification 
from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dishonorable 
discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or professional 
licenses.”145  None of these consequences were directly addressed by the 
majority. 
3. The Clear/Unclear Analytical Framework is Unworkable 
The concurrence further notes immigration is an entirely separate 
branch of law from criminal law, and a particularly tricky one at that.146 
Thus, it will be difficult to distinguish between a clear and an unclear 
question of immigration law for any attorney, much less one who is not 
experienced in the area.147  Justice Alito cites an immigration guidebook for 
criminal lawyers to make the point that “nothing is ever simple with immi-
gration law” and to counter the majority’s argument that professional 
guidebooks support the majority’s holding.148 
Alito also points to several examples of how complicated determining 
whether conviction will lead to deportation can be.  For instance, most 
deportable crimes fall within the categories of “crimes involving moral 
turpitude” (CIMT) or “aggravated felonies.”149  What constitutes a CIMT or 
aggravated felony can vary by the court or agency interpreting the law.150 
4. Additional Problems with the Majority Approach 
According to the concurrence, there are additional reasons why the 
Court’s holding could be problematic.  First, Justice Alito warns that 
providing advice about just one of the collateral consequences of conviction 
could mislead a defendant to believe that the consequences she discusses 
with her attorney are all of the possible consequences.151  For example, a 
certain offense may not be a deportable offense, but it may render the 
noncitizen inadmissible, meaning that if the noncitizen leaves the country, 
he or she would not be allowed to return.152  This incomplete advice may 
discourage the noncitizen from seeking more competent advice from an 
 
145. Id. 
146. See id. at 1488-90. 
147. Id. at 1490-91. 
148. Id. at 1490 (quoting ROBERT JAMES MCWHIRTER, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE CRIMINAL 
LAWYER’S GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION LAW § 4.65, at 130 (2d ed. 2006)). 
149. Id. at 1488. 
150. Id. at 1489 (providing an example concerning whether simple possession is an 
aggravated felony under Ninth Circuit law). 
151. See id. at 1491. 
152. Id. 
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immigration attorney.153  The concurrence does not, however, squarely 
address the majority’s concern that indigent defendants may have virtually 
no access to this information if they do not receive it from their criminal 
defense counsel.154  Instead, the concurrence notes that “[i]ncomplete legal 
advice may be worse than no advice at all.”155 
Justice Alito contends there are better ways to address this problem, 
such as administrative or statutory reforms, that the constitutional rule 
announced by the majority could impede.156  The concurrence describes the 
majority’s decision as a “major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law,” stating 
“the Court’s view has been rejected by every Federal Court of Appeals to 
have considered the issue.”157 
E. THE DISSENTING OPINION 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented.158  The dissent 
argued that because Padilla had no constitutional right to receive advice 
about immigration consequences, Padilla’s counsel could not be ineffective 
for providing inaccurate advice on that subject.159  Scalia reasoned that in a 
perfect world, a criminal defendant would be well-informed about all of the 
direct and collateral consequences he or she faces as a result of conviction.  
However, the Constitution does not require advice on collateral matters.160  
Scalia argued, “[the Court has] never held . . . that once counsel is 
appointed all professional responsibilities of counsel—even those extending 
beyond defense against the prosecution—become constitutional 
commands.”161  Therefore, he would draw a sharp line separating “defense 
at trial” from additional objectives, which may be important, but they are 
not directly related to the defense against the charge.162 
Scalia voiced skepticism of the idea that the State must provide counsel 
to indigent defendants, as well as the idea that counsel must be 
competent.163  He opined that the Sixth Amendment originally meant that 
the State could not deny a defendant the right to hire an attorney to assist in 
 
153. Id. 




158. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
159. See id. at 1494-95. 
160. Id. at 1494. 
161. Id. at 1495. 
162. Id. (quoting Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 216 (2008)). 
163. See id. 
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his or her defense.164  Scalia was unwilling to extend the right to effective 
counsel to any collateral objectives.165 
The dissent would hold that since Padilla had no right to effective 
assistance of counsel regarding immigration consequences, even affirmative 
misadvice would not violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective 
assistance of counsel.166  Scalia points out that adding to the duties of 
defense counsel has no logical stopping point.167  According to Scalia, the 
concurrence’s proposed bright line rule requiring counsel to merely advise 
of potential immigration consequences is defective because it too slides 
down a slippery slope.168 
To illustrate, Scalia points out there would likely have to be a warning 
about the subsequent application of the Armed Career Criminal Act.169  
“We could expect years of elaboration upon these new issues in the lower 
courts, prompted by the defense bar’s devising of ever-expanding categories 
of plea-invalidating misadvice and failures to warn—not to mention 
innumerable evidentiary hearings to determine whether misadvice really 
occurred or whether the warning was really given.”170  Like the con-
currence, Scalia suggested legislation rather than a constitutional rule may 
be a more appropriate vehicle for addressing advice concerning immi-
gration consequences.171 
III. PADILLA’S IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA 
After outlining Padilla, the question becomes how it applies to North 
Dakota.  First, this section outlines the prevailing professional norms in 
North Dakota.  Second, it addresses whether Padilla overrules or abrogates 
any existing North Dakota state law.  Third, it outlines a non-exhaustive list 
of North Dakota crimes with relatively clear immigration consequences.  
Finally, it addresses whether Padilla requires counsel to advise clients of 
other consequences outside of the immigration context.  Each of these 




166. Id. at 1494-95. 
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A. PREVAILING PROFESSIONAL NORMS IN NORTH DAKOTA 
In finding Padilla’s counsel’s performance constitutionally deficient, 
the Court relied heavily upon performance guidelines promulgated by a 
number of national professional organizations.172  The Court noted the 
American Bar Association standards are guides to determining the 
reasonableness of counsel’s performance.173  Although the Court relied on 
the American Bar Association standards as a guide,174 it also cited the per-
formance standards from the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association,175 the Department of Justice,176 and a number of law review 
articles, treatises, and practice aids as illustrative of counsel’s expected 
conduct.177  Based on these resources, it was clear to the Court “[t]he 
weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel 
must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.”178 
In North Dakota, the Commission on Legal Counsel for Indigents has 
promulgated performance standards for public defenders and contract 
attorneys taking indigent defense cases in North Dakota.  The 
Commission’s performance standards are very similar, if not identical, to 
the professional standards discussed in Padilla.179  In fact, the 
Commission’s performance standards are, in large part, adapted from the 
performance standards cited by the Supreme Court.180  The North Dakota 
performance standards require public defenders and contract attorneys to 
investigate, consider, use, and discuss reasonably foreseeable collateral 
 
172. See id. at 1482-83 (majority opinion). 
173. Id. at 1482. 
174. Id. (citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY 14-3.2(f) (3d ed. 
1999); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION 4-
5.1(a), (3d ed. 1993)). 
175. Id. (citing NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR 
CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION § 6.2 (1995)). 
176. Id. (citing 2 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, COMPENDIUM OF 
STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEY PERFORMANCE, 
D10, H8-H9, J8 (2000), available at http://www mynlada.org/defender/DOJ/ 
standardsv2/welcome html).  
177. See id. (citing 2 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL §§ 45:3, 45:15 (2009); G. NICHOLAS 
HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING § 3.03, at 20-21 (1997); 1 NORTON TOOBY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE OF 
IMMIGRANTS § 1.3, at 12-13 (3d ed. 2003); Chin & Holmes, supra note 132, at 713-18; Scott E. 
Bratton, Practice Points: Representing a Noncitizen in a Criminal Case, 31 THE CHAMPION, 
Jan./Feb. 2007, at 61. 
178. Id. 
179. See generally COMM’N ON LEGAL COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS, MINIMUM ATTORNEY 
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL MATTERS, available at http://www nd.gov/indigents/ 
docs/performanceStandardsCriminal.pdf. 
180. See generally id. 
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consequences in all stages of the proceedings.181  For instance, in preparing 
and developing a plea negotiation strategy, defense counsel must be aware 
of and advise the defendant of a number of other “collateral consequences,” 
which may include immigration consequences, money, property, or 
professional license forfeiture, ineligibility for government assistance or 
programming like student loans, the loss of the right to possess a firearm, 
the loss of driving privileges, the inability to vote or hold public office, and 
sex offender registration requirements.182 
Before the entry of a plea, the standards dictate counsel should ensure 
the client “receives a full explanation of the conditions and limits of the 
plea agreement and the maximum punishment, sanctions, and collateral 
consequences the client will be exposed to by entering a plea.”183  At 
sentencing, among counsel’s other duties, the standards require counsel to 
“ensure that a plea agreement is negotiated with consideration of the 
sentencing, correctional, financial, and collateral implications” of the 
sentence.184  Finally, the performance standards note that counsel should be 
familiar with and explain to the client the direct and collateral consequences 
of the sentence and judgment, including: 
1. credit for pre-trial detention; 
2. parole eligibility and applicable parole release ranges (if 
applicable); 
3. place of confinement and level of security and classification 
criteria used by the North Dakota Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation; 
4. eligibility for correctional and educational programs; 
5. availability of drug rehabilitation programs, psychiatric 
treatment, health care, and other treatment programs; 
6. the possibility of negative immigration consequences; 
7. loss of civil rights; 
8. impact of a fine or restitution and any resulting civil liability; 
 
181. See, e.g., id. at 10.2 (Plea Negotiations—Negotiations); id. at 10.4 (Plea Negotiation—
Entry of Plea before the Court); id. at 12.1 (Sentencing—Obligations of Counsel); id. at 12.2(B) 
(Sentencing—Options, Consequences and Procedures—Counsel’s Familiarity with Direct and 
Collateral Consequences of the Sentence). 
182. Id. at 10.2(A)(3). 
183. Id. at 10.4(2). 
184. Id. at 12.1(1). 
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9. possible revocation of probation, possible revocation of first 
offender status, or possible revocation of parole status if client is 
serving a prior sentence on a parole status; 
10. suspension of a motor vehicle operator’s permit; 
11. prohibition of carrying a firearm; and 
12. other consequences of conviction including but not limited to, 
the forfeiture of professional licensure, the ineligibility for various 
government programs including student loans, registration as a sex 
offender, loss of public housing and the loss of the right to hold 
public office.185 
In light of these performance standards, public defenders and contract 
attorneys practicing in North Dakota already should have been Padilla 
compliant, but private defense counsel may or may not have been following 
these standards in their practice.  Nevertheless, the Commission’s perfor-
mance standards are useful guides into the prevailing professional norms 
for the entire North Dakota criminal defense bar.  Padilla serves as a 
reminder that “other” consequences like deportation and sex offender regis-
tration are often equally or more important to clients than a criminal 
conviction. 
B. PADILLA’S EFFECT ON NORTH DAKOTA STATE LAW 
The Padilla decision illustrates a constitutional paradigm shift in the 
law governing lawyers.  As both the concurrence and dissent noted, the 
Supreme Court’s longstanding Sixth Amendment jurisprudence required 
counsel only advise criminal defendants of the direct consequences of the 
criminal case, not collateral consequences.  Direct consequences are 
typically defined as consequences that are a direct, immediate, and 
automatic result of the criminal case, whereas collateral consequences are 
matters outside of the sentencing court’s control and for which the 
sentencing court has no responsibility.186  Following this traditional 
approach, the North Dakota Supreme Court has repeatedly held a criminal 
defendant is not entitled to withdraw a guilty plea or obtain post-conviction 
relief when the trial court or defense counsel failed to advise a defendant 
 
185. Id. at 12.2(B). 
186. See, e.g., State v. Abdullahi, 2000 ND 39, ¶¶ 9-18, 607 N.W.2d 561, 564-67 (discussing 
the direct versus collateral distinction).  The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that direct 
consequences are those contained within North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, while 
consequences outside of the mandates of Rule 11 are “collateral” in nature.  Id. ¶ 18; 607 N.W.2d 
at 567 (“[W]e decline to extend a court’s obligation to inform a defendant about the immigration 
consequences of a guilty plea beyond those direct consequences identified in [Rule] 11.”).   
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about important collateral consequences.187  Those consequences, for 
example, have included the application of the parole eligibility provision,188 
the failure to inform a defendant of sex offender registration 
requirements,189 the immigration consequences resulting from a plea,190 and 
penalty enhancements for subsequent offenses.191 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Padilla, however, abrogates three 
North Dakota cases: State v. Abdullahi,192 Abdi v. State,193 and State v. 
Dalman.194  In Abdullahi, the defendant was a noncitizen charged with 
gross sexual imposition.195  At the initial appearance, the trial court advised 
Abdullahi that “[if he is] not a citizen of the United States and [he is] 
convicted of a crime either by pleading guilty or by a trial, [he] may be 
deported to another country.”196  At the preliminary hearing, Abdullahi was 
again advised that if he is not a citizen and is convicted, he may be 
deported.”197  Eventually, Abdullahi pled guilty to gross sexual impo-
sition.198  The court sentenced Abdullahi to one year in custody with all but 
six months suspended for two years.199 
Abdullahi’s conviction for gross sexual imposition was an aggravated 
felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43)(A), “which, according to him, included 
 
187. See, e.g., State v. Raulston, 2005 ND 212, ¶ 12, 701 N.W.2d 464, 468 (stating the court 
has no obligation to advise the defendant of the 85 percent parole eligibility rule because it is a 
collateral consequence); Abdullahi, ¶ 19, 607 N.W.2d at 567 (explaining immigration 
consequences are collateral and the court need not advise defendants of collateral consequences 
before accepting guilty pleas); Davenport v. State, 2000 ND 218, ¶ 10, 620 N.W.2d 164, 166 
(refusing to allow a defendant to withdraw his plea when he was not advised of the sex offender 
registration requirements because sex offender registration was a collateral consequence); State v. 
Burr, 1999 ND 143, ¶ 36, 598 N.W.2d 147, 159 (determining sex offender registration is a 
collateral consequence); State v. Magnuson, 1997 ND 228, ¶ 21, 571 N.W.2d 642, 646 (stating 
eighty-five percent rule is a collateral consequence); State v. Dalman, 520 N.W.2d 860, 863 (N.D. 
1994) (providing deportation is a collateral consequence and the court need not inform defendants 
of collateral consequences); Houle v. State, 482 N.W.2d 24, 28 (N.D. 1992) (stating eighty-five 
percent parole eligibility requirement is a collateral consequence). 
188. Raulston, ¶ 12, 701 N.W.2d at 468; Magnuson, ¶ 21, 571 N.W.2d at 646; Houle, 482 
N.W.2d at 28. 
189. Davenport, ¶ 10, 620 N.W.2d at 468; Burr, ¶ 36, 598 N.W.2d at 159. 
190. Abdi v. State, 2000 ND 64, ¶¶ 30-32, 608 N.W.2d 292, 301-02 (denying an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim when the defendant alleged his counsel did not inform him of certain 
immigration consequences); Abdullahi, ¶ 19, 607 N.W.2d at 567; Dalman, 520 N.W.2d at 863. 
191. State v. Berger, 1999 ND 46, ¶ 14, 590 N.W.2d 884, 888 (noting the possibility of a 
future sentence enhancement is a collateral consequence for which there is no obligation to inform 
the defendant). 
192. 2000 ND 39, 607 N.W.2d 561. 
193. 2000 ND 64, 608 N.W.2d 292. 
194. 520 N.W.2d 860 (N.D. 1994). 
195. Abdullahi, ¶ 2, 607 N.W.2d at 562. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. ¶ 3, 607 N.W.2d at 563. 
198. Id. ¶ 5.  
199. Id. at 564. 
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mandatory, indefinite detention and automatic deportation.”200  As a result, 
Abdullahi moved to withdraw his guilty plea.201  The court denied his 
motion, finding there was no manifest injustice.202  Abdullahi appealed to 
the North Dakota Supreme Court,203 where he argued he was not informed 
of a “direct” consequence of his plea, deportation, and a mandatory, 
indefinite detention automatically flowing from his “aggravated felony” 
conviction.204 
While the North Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Dalman had already 
determined immigration consequences were collateral in 1994, Abdullahi 
argued a 1996 amendment to federal immigration law changed the conse-
quences from “collateral” to “direct” because these penalties now were 
“definite, immediate, and automatic consequences of crimes that are 
classified as aggravated felonies under federal immigration law.”205  The 
supreme court disagreed, holding “a trial court is not required to advise a 
defendant about deportation and mandatory, indefinite detention before 
accepting a guilty plea to a state criminal charge.”206  The court reasoned 
that  
[w]hat renders the plea’s immigration effects ‘collateral’ is not that 
they arise ‘virtually by operation of law,’ but the fact that 
deportation is ‘not the sentence of the court which accept[s] the 
plea of another agency over which the trial judge has no control 
and for which he has no responsibility.’207 
Therefore, the trial court was not required to inform Abdullahi about 
the immigration consequences of a guilty plea to gross sexual imposition.208  
“Although not required, the trial court advised Abdullahi that he ‘may be 
deported to another country’ if convicted of the crime, either by pleading 
guilty or by trial.”209  The supreme court concluded the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Abdullahi to withdraw his guilty 
plea.210 
 
200. Id. ¶ 6. 
201. Id. 
202. See id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. ¶ 10, 607 N.W.2d at 565. 
205. Id. ¶ 12. 
206. Id. ¶ 14, 607 N.W.2d at 566. 
207. Id. ¶ 18, 607 N.W.2d at 567 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st 
Cir. 2000)). 
208. Id. ¶ 19. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
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Likewise, in Abdi, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed 
counsel’s failure to provide accurate immigration advice.211  Abdi was 
charged with two counts of aggravated assault for stabbing two people.212  
The State filed an amended information, which reduced the charges from 
two class C felony aggravated assault counts to one class A misdemeanor 
assault count.213  Abdi pled guilty, and the court sentenced him to one year 
in jail, with credit for the ninety-five days he already served in jail, and the 
balance of the one year suspended.214 
In light of the charge and the sentence imposed, the charge to which 
Abdi pled guilty had adverse immigration consequences.215  Abdi applied 
for post-conviction relief.  Abdi requested summary disposition of his 
claims without an evidentiary hearing.216  Acting on Abdi’s motion, the trial 
court denied him post-conviction relief.217 
In determining Abdi’s plea was voluntary and not a result of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the North Dakota Supreme Court relied 
upon Abdullahi, noting immigration consequences were collateral to the 
criminal case.218  The court also noted the record was not sufficient to ade-
quately evaluate the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.219  
Nevertheless, due to the court’s reliance on Abdullahi in other contexts, 
even if the record were complete, it appears as though the court was 
inclined to rule precisely as it did in Abdullahi. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the same issue in 1994 in 
State v. Dalman.220  Dalman was a Canadian citizen.221  She was charged 
with six counts of class B felony security violations in 1992.222  Dalman 
pled guilty to two counts of class C felony theft, while the securities viola-
tions were dismissed.223  Dalman was given a three-year deferred 
 
211. Abdi v. State, 2000 ND 64, ¶ 28, 608 N.W.2d 292, 301 (arguing Abdi’s trial counsel 
was, among other things, ineffective due to failing to “inform him of the ‘certain’ immigration 
consequences of his guilty plea”). 
212. Id. ¶ 2, 608 N.W.2d at 294. 
213. Id. ¶ 5, 608 N.W.2d at 295. 
214. Id. ¶ 6, 608 N.W.2d at 296. 
215. See id. ¶ 7. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. ¶¶ 23, 28, 33, 608 N.W.2d at 299-300, 302. 
219. Id. ¶¶ 30-32, 608 N.W.2d at 301-02 (noting Abdi sought summary disposition without 
an evidentiary hearing, but did not obtain an affidavit from his trial counsel, so he was estopped 
from claiming error in not adequately developing the record). 
220. State v. Dalman, 520 N.W.2d 860, 862 (N.D. 1994). 
221. Id. at 861. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
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imposition of sentence.224  The next year, Dalman moved to withdraw her 
guilty pleas, arguing, among other things, “that the sentencing court failed 
to inform her of the possibility of being deported” and “that her attorneys 
also failed to inform her of the possibility of being deported.”225  The 
district court denied her motion to withdraw, and Dalman appealed.226 
In addressing Dalman’s arguments, the supreme court reasoned North 
Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 did not require the sentencing court 
to advise her of a collateral matter.227  As for Dalman’s ineffective assis-
tance claim, the court acknowledged Dalman’s argument was an issue of 
first impression.228  Consequently, the court relied heavily on other states’ 
decisions.229 
Abdullahi, Abdi, and Dalman stand for the proposition that neither 
defense counsel nor the court must advise the defendant of potential 
immigration concerns because those issues are collateral consequences.230  
Padilla abrogates Abdullahi, Abdi, and Dalman’s holdings.  Now, counsel 
must provide competent advice concerning immigration when those conse-
quences are clear and identify those issues when the consequences are not 
clear.231  Where the consequences are not clear, counsel must inform the 
defendant that there may be adverse immigration consequences. 
 
224. Id. 
225. Id. at 862. 
226. Id. at 861. 
227. Id. at 862-63. 
228. Id. at 863. 
229. See, e.g., Mott v. State, 407 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Iowa 1987) (“failure to advise a 
defendant concerning collateral consequences, even serious ones, cannot provide a basis for a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”); see also Oyekoya v. State, 558 So. 2d 990, 990 (Ala. 
Crim. App.1989), (counsel’s failure to advise defendant of collateral consequences, such as 
deportation, is not ineffective assistance of counsel); Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247, 252 (Alaska 
1972) (failure of counsel to inform defendant of possible collateral consequence of deportation did 
not rise to level of ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Casseus, 513 So. 2d 1045, 1045 (Fla. 
1987) (counsel’s failure to advise client of collateral consequence of deportation did not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Chung, 510 A.2d 72, 77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1986) (counsel did not render inefficient assistance of counsel by failing to inform defendant of 
possible collateral consequence of deportation); People v. Dor, 505 N.Y.S.2d 317, 320 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1986) (failure to discuss collateral consequence of deportation did not rise to ineffective 
assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92, 93-94 (Pa. 1989) (counsel not 
required to advise defendant of collateral consequences of pleading guilty); State v. Malik, 680 
P.2d 770, 772 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), (“The possibility of deportation, being collateral, was not 
properly a concern of appointed counsel.”). 
230. See State v. Abdullahi, 2000 ND 39, ¶¶ 8-18, 607 N.W.2d 561, 564-67; Dalman, 520 
N.W.2d at 862-64.  
231. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010). 
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C. NORTH DAKOTA CRIMES WITH “CLEAR-ISH”  
IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES 
The Padilla majority held that where the immigration consequences of 
a criminal case are “succinct, clear, and explicit,” counsel has an affirmative 
duty to correctly and competently advise clients of the immigration 
consequences of a criminal conviction.232  Justice Stevens lamented that 
Padilla’s counsel could have easily determined Padilla was deportable by 
merely referring to the statute.233  The Court also acknowledged that 
immigration law is complex; not all situations are clear.234  When the immi-
gration consequences are not clear, however, defense counsel “need do no 
more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may 
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.”235  Therefore, there is 
an important distinction to be made between “clear” and “unclear” cases.  
Post-Padilla, constitutionally competent counsel has an obligation to locate 
the immigration statutes and read them to determine whether the 
immigration consequences can be “easily determined.”236 
As courts around the country are still sifting through this distinction, 
some legal commentators have argued “clear” cases are situations involving 
aggravated felony offenses described in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), while 
“unclear” cases are those involving inadmissibility under 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A) and deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).237  
Although aggravated felonies under § 1101(a)(43) almost always result in 
automatic deportation, several of the offenses covered in §§ 1182 and 1227 
are “unclear” because they are subject to the application of certain waivers 
of inadmissibility or deportability.238  Additionally, as Justice Alito noted, 
many of the offenses are contained within undefined, broad categories of 
offenses such as CIMTs.239 
The following Table A includes a non-exclusive compilation of North 
Dakota state crimes that may adversely affect a noncitizen’s immigration 
status.240  The table should be used as a guide and starting point for counsel 






236. See id. 
237. See, e.g., H. Raymond Fasano & Donald F. Madeo, A Guide to Fulfilling Counsel’s 
Obligations Under Padilla to Advise Criminal Defendants of the Immigration Consequences of 
Criminal Dispositions, INTERPRETER RELEASES, June 7, 2010, at 1117, 1119.  
238. Id. at 1119-22.   
239. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488-90. 
240. See infra Table A. 
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rather than a substitute for legal research.  If there is any doubt as to 
whether an offense has “clear” or “unclear” immigration consequences, a 
defense attorney should perform his or her own legal research, consult 
another attorney well-versed in immigration law, or direct the client to 
consult an immigration attorney. 
As illustrated by Table A, there are a number of North Dakota crimes 
carrying adverse immigration consequences.  Offenses such as murder, 
rape, and sexual abuse of a minor, for instance, clearly rebut in adverse 
immigration consequences.241  These crimes are clearly defined as 
aggravated felonies, rendering the noncitizen deportable and inadmissible.  
Other classifications of offenses such as “crimes of violence,” “crimes of 
domestic violence,” or CIMTs are much more difficult to define as “clear” 
cases, largely because those offenses are typically defined on a case-by-case 
basis.  Further complicating the matter is the fact that there are certain 
offenses for which immigration law provides some relief in terms of 
waivers of inadmissibility or waivers from deportation under 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1182(a)(2) and 1227(a)(2). 
Counsel’s awareness of immigration consequences is useful on 
contexts beyond providing misadvice to clients to meet effective counsel 
standards.  For instance, Justice Stevens noted both parties benefit from 
“informed consideration” of immigration consequences when plea 
bargaining.242  Justice Stevens quipped that this consideration will lead to 
creative plea bargains to reduce the likelihood of adverse immigration 
consequences.243  When counsel is fully aware of the potential 
consequences, counsel can properly advise the client and form a creative 
negotiation strategy consistent with the client’s interests.244  In other words, 
both parties should work diligently to craft creative plea agreements to 
avoid overly harsh consequences where possible in order to do what is 
right, just, and fair under the circumstances considering the totality of the 







241. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43)(A) (2006) (defining murder, rape, and sexual abuse of a minor 
as “aggravated felony” offenses); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (determining that a person 
convicted of an aggravated felony is deportable). 
242. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
243. Id. 
244. See COMM’N ON LEGAL COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS, supra note 179, at 10.2. 
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TABLE A 
SELECTED NORTH DAKOTA CRIMES  
WITH IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES 
Crime North Dakota Century 
Code (N.D. CENT. CODE) 
Reference 
United States Code 
Reference (8 U.S.C.) 
Murder § 12.1-16-01 § 1101(a)(43)(A) 
(including murder as an 
aggravated felony); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 
aggravated felonies are 
deportable) 
Rape § 12.1-20-03 (gross sexual 
imposition); § 12.1-20-04 
(sexual imposition); § 12.1-20-
07 (sexual assault) 
§ 1101(a)(43)(A) 
(including rape as an 
aggravated felony); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 
aggravated felonies are 
deportable) 
Sexual abuse of a 
minor 
§ 12.1-20-03.1 § 1101(a)(43)(A) 
(including sexual abuse of 
a minor as an aggravated 
felony); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 
aggravated felonies are 
deportable) 
Drug trafficking § 19-03.1-23 (Supp. 2011) 
(prohibiting the manufacture, 
delivery, or possession with 
intent to manufacture or deliver 
a controlled substance) 
§ 1101(a)(43)(B) 
(including illicit controlled 
substance trafficking as an 
aggravated felony); 
§ 1182(a)(2)(C) (stating the 
Attorney General or 
consular officer need only 
have “reason to believe” an 
alien is a trafficker); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aliens 
convicted of aggravated 
felonies are deportable) 
          






§ 62.1-02-08 (2010) § 1101(a)(43)(C) 
(including illicit trafficking 
of firearms, destructive 
devices, or explosive 
materials as an aggravated 
felony); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 





§ 62.1-05-01 (prohibiting 




materials offenses as 
aggravated felonies); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 




chs. 62.1-01 to -05 (2010 & 
Supp. 2011) 
§ 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii) 
(defining a firearm offense 
as an aggravated felony); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 
aggravated felonies are 
deportable); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(C) (allowing 
deportation of aliens 
convicted of purchasing, 
selling, offering for sale, 
exchanging, using, owning, 
possessing, or carrying, or 
attempting or conspiring to 




Crimes of violence are 
determined on a case-by-case 
basis, but include “crime[s] in 
which force . . . or threat of 
force was used against the 
victim.” 
§ 12.1-34-01(3). 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F) (including 
a crime of violence for 
which the term is one year 
imprisonment as an 
aggravated felony); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 
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“Force” may be used in the 
following crimes:   
§ 12.1-17-02 (aggravated 
assault); 
§12.1-17-01.1 (assault); 
§ 12.1-17-04 (terrorizing); 
§ 12.1-17-05 (menacing); 
§ 12.1-20-03 (gross sexual 
imposition); 
§ 12.1-20-04 (sexual 
imposition); 
§ 12.1-20-07 (sexual assault); 
§ 12.1-21-05 (criminal 
mischief); 
§ 12.1-21-01 (arson); 
§ 12.1-31-02 (endangering by 
fire or explosion); 
§ 12.1-21-06.1 (interference 
with telephone during 
emergency; 
§ 12.1-22-01 (robbery); 
§12.1-25-01 (inciting to riot) 
aggravated felonies are 
deportable) 
18 U.S.C. § 16 (defining 
“crime of violence” as  “an 
offense that has as an 
element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the 
person or property of 
another, or . . . any other 
offense that is a felony and 
that, by its nature, involves 
a substantial risk that 
physical force against the 
person or property of 
another may be used in the 




ch. 12.1-23 § 1101(a)(43)(G) 
(including a theft offense 
for which the term of 
imprisonment is one year 
as an aggravated felony); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 
aggravated felonies are 
deportable) 
Burglary § 12.1-22-02 § 1101(a)(43)(G) 
(including a burglary 
offense for which the term 
of imprisonment is one 
year as an aggravated 
felony); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 
aggravated felonies are 
deportable) 
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Child 
pornography 
§ 12.1-27.2-04.1 § 1101(a)(43)(I) (including 
child pornography offenses 
as aggravated felonies); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 








ch. 12.1-06.1 § 1101(a)(43)(J) (including 
RICO offenses punishable 




(stating aliens convicted of 





§ 12.1-28-02 § 1101(a)(43)(J) (including 
gambling offenses 




(stating aliens convicted of 






§§ 12.1-29-01 to -02 § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i) 
(including, as an 
aggravated felony, an 
offense that relates to 
“owning, controlling, 
managing, or 
supervising . . . a 
prostitution business”); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 
aggravated felonies are 
deportable) 
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Human 
trafficking 
§ 12.1-40-01 § 1101(a)(43)(K)(iii) 
(including “trafficking in 
persons” as an aggravated 
felony); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 
aggravated felonies are 
deportable); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(F) (Supp. 
2011) (stating an alien 
engaged in trafficking is 
deportable) 
 
Treason § 12.1-07-01; 
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 17 
§ 1101(a)(43)(L)(i) 
(including an offense 
related to treason as an 
aggravated felony); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 
aggravated felonies are 
deportable) 
 
Fraud  § 12.1-06.1-08 (prohibiting 
computer fraud; 
§ 12.1-23-08 (prohibiting fraud 
against secured creditors); 
ch. 12.1-24 (prohibiting 
forgery and counterfeiting) 
 
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) 
(including fraud with loss 
to a victim in excess of 
$10,000 as an aggravated 
felony); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 
aggravated felonies are 
deportable) 




§ 12.1-08-05 (stating that 
failure to appear for service of 
sentence if underlying offense 
is class C felony or greater) 
§ 1101(a)(43)(Q) 
(including “an offense to 
appear . . . for service of 
sentence if the underlying 
offense is punishable by 
imprisonment for [five] 
years of more” as an 
aggravated felony); 
§ 1101(a)(43)(T) 
(including failure to appear 
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pursuant to a court order as 
an aggravated felony); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 




§§ 12.1-08-01 to -03 
 
§ 1101(a)(43)(S) (including 
an offense related to 
obstruction of justice if 
punishable for one year 
imprisonment as an 
aggravated felony); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 







§ 12.1-11-01 § 1101(a)(43)(S) (including 
“an offense relating to . . . 
perjury or subordination of 
perjury” punishable for one 
year’s imprisonment as an 
aggravated felony); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 









§ 12.1-09-01 § 1101(a)(43)(S) (including 
“bribery of a witness” if 
the offense is punishable 
for one year’s 
imprisonment as an 
aggravated felony); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(stating aliens convicted of 
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Fleeing from law 
enforcement 
agency in a 
motor vehicle 
 
§ 39-10-71 § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iv) (stating 
an alien convicted of a high 
speed flight from an 
immigration checkpoint is 
deportable) 
 
Failure to register 
as a sex offender 
 
§ 12.1-32-15 § 1227(a)(2)(A)(v) (failing 







§ 19-03.1-23 (2009) 
(possession of controlled 
substances); 
§ 19-03.4-03 (possession of 
drug paraphernalia) 
§ 1182(a)(2)(C)(i) (not 
allowing admission of 
aliens who are illicit 
traffickers); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) 
(allowing deportation of 
aliens convicted of 
controlled substances 
offenses other than single 
offenses “involving 
possession for one’s own 
use . . . [thirty] grams or 
less of marijuana”) 
Drug use or 
addiction 
 
ch. 19-03.1 (uniform controlled 
substances act); 
ch. 19-03.4 (drug 
paraphernalia) 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) 
(allowing deportation of an 
alien who is or has been a 




Crimes of domestic violence 
are determined on a case-by-
case basis, but include 
misdemeanor offenses like 
simple assault/domestic 
violence (§ 12.1-17-01) where 
the victim is a household or 
family member. § 12.1-17-01 
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) 
(allowing deportation of 
aliens “convicted of a 
crime of domestic 
violence” which is “any 
crime of violence . . . 
against a person committed 
by a current or former 
spouse of the person, by an 
individual with whom the 
person shares a child in 
common, by an individual 
who is cohabiting with or 
has cohabited with the 
person as a spouse, by an 
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245. 2 Tooby, supra note 177, § 7.2 at 664. 
individual similarly 
situated to a spouse of the 
person under the domestic 
or family violence laws of 
the jurisdiction where the 
offense occurs, or by any 
other individual against a 
person who is protected 
from that individual’s acts 
under the domestic or 
family violence laws of the 
United States or any State, 
Indian tribal government, 







(allowing deportation of an 
alien convicted of the 
“crime of stalking”) 
Child abuse and 
neglect or 
abandonment 
§ 14-09-22 § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) 
(allowing deportation of an 
alien convicted of child 





§§ 14-07.1-02, -06 
 
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) 
(allowing deportation of an 
alien who violates a 




An alien who is 




five years after 
the date of 
Crimes involving moral 
turpitude are determined on a 
case-by-case basis.  Generally, 
CIMTs include “offenses 
involving fraud, theft, intent to 
commit serious bodily harm, 
lewdness, malice, or sometimes 
recklessness . . . .”245 CIMTs 
typically include one or more 
of the following factors: 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) 
(allowing no admission to 
aliens convicted of a 
CIMT); 
§ 1182(a)(2)(B) (allowing 
no admission to aliens 
convicted of multiple 
CIMTs); 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) 
(allowing deportation of an 
          







246. Id. at 663.  
admission, or 
two or more 
crimes involving 
moral turpitude 
not arising from 




“1.  an intent to defraud or steal 
is an element; 
2.  great bodily harm is caused 
or threatened by an intentional, 
willful, or reckless act; 
3.  ‘malice’ is an element; or 
4.  sex offenses in which some 
‘lewd’ intent is an element.”246 
Even misdemeanor offenses 
can qualify as CIMTs. 
For example, B misdemeanor 
theft under sections 12.1-23-02 
and 12.1-23-05 will likely 
qualify as a CIMT.  Issuing 
checks with insufficient funds 
under section 6-08-16 may or 
may not be a CIMT.  Issuing a 
check without an account 
under section 6-08-16.1 is 
likely a CIMT. Class A 
misdemeanor false information 
to law enforcement under 
section 12.1-11-03 is likely a 
CIMT. 
 





§ 12.1-29-03  § 1182(a)(2)(D) (allowing 
no admission to an alien 
who has or is engaged in 
prostitution)  
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D. DUTY TO ADVISE CLIENT OF OTHER CONSEQUENCES 
In finding deportation was a unique and particularly severe penalty inti-
mately related to the criminal case, the Supreme Court in Padilla deter-
mined the traditional collateral consequences rule—that constitutionally 
competent counsel need only inform the defendant of the direct conse-
quences of the criminal case—did not apply.247  Justice Stevens noted that 
because of its integration with the criminal justice system, deportation is 
“uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or collateral conse-
quence.”248  Consequently, the majority decided the “collateral versus direct 
distinction is . . . ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the 
specific risk of deportation.”249  Justice Alito, however, noted: 
This case happens to involve removal, but criminal convictions 
can carry a wide variety of consequences other than conviction and 
sentencing, including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of 
the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility 
to possess firearms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed 
Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses . . . .  A 
criminal conviction may also severely damage a defendant’s 
reputation and thus impair the defendant’s ability to obtain future 
employment or business opportunities.  All of those consequences 
are “serious, . . .” but this Court has never held that a criminal 
defense attorney’s Sixth Amendment duties extend to providing 
advice about such matters.250 
Justice Alito foreshadowed the million-dollar question: what makes 
immigration so special?  Its seriousness or severity?  The fact that it is 
closely related to the criminal process?  The nearly automatic result?  The 
concurrence recognized there are a number of other consequences to which 
Padilla’s reasoning could be applied,251 which is precisely the issue playing 
out in courtrooms around the country.252 
 
247. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481-82. 
248. Id. at 1482. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring). 
251. Id. 
252. Id.; see also Mark Walsh, Weighing the Consequences: Task Force Probes Defense 
Lawyers’ Role after Padilla, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2011, at 60, 61 (noting there have been more than one 
hundred lower court decisions citing Padilla since it was decided in March 2010). 
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1. Cases Applying Padilla Outside of the Immigration Context 
Padilla’s holding, which requires competent, affirmative advice, has 
been applied in cases involving misadvice concerning civil commitment as 
a sexually violent predator,253 and misadvice concerning whether a no-
contest plea would prohibit a subsequent challenge to the elements of the 
crime in a civil lawsuit arising from the criminal conduct.254  Additionally, 
Padilla’s holding has been applied to failure to advise a defendant of the 
requirement to register as a sexual offender,255 misadvice concerning the 
applicability of a parole eligibility requirement,256 and the failure to advise 
the defendant of the automatic forfeiture of a teacher’s pension as a result of 
a guilty plea to a sex crime in the scope of his employment.257 
a. Civil Commitment as a Sexually Violent Predator 
In Bauder v. Department of Corrections,258 a Florida state prisoner 
sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 
claiming his counsel misadvised him about whether he would be civilly 
committed as a sexually violent predator if he entered a plea of no-contest 
to aggravated stalking of a minor.259  Bauder pled guilty to the charge in 
2002,260 but shortly before trial, Bauder entered a plea of no-contest at 
which time the court ordered him to be civilly committed.261  Bauder 
appealed, and the appellate court affirmed his conviction.262  Bauder sought 
review from the Florida Supreme Court, which dismissed his petition for 
further review.263  Bauder then filed a state petition for post-conviction 
 
253. Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010). But see Brown v. 
Goodwin, No. 09-211, 2010 WL 1930574 , at *13 (D.N.J. May 11, 2010) (declining to extend 
Padilla to civil commitment as a sexually violent predator). 
254. Wilson v. State, 244 P.3d 535, 539 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010). 
255. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).  But see Maxwell v. 
Larkins, No. 4:08 CV 1896 DDN, 2010 WL 2680333, at *10 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2010) (declining to 
extend Padilla to sex offender registration). 
256. See generally Pridham v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-CA-002190-MR (Ky. Ct. App. 
Nov. 19, 2010), http://apps.courts ky.gov/supreme/sc_opinions.shtm (applying Padilla’s reasoning 
to gross misadvice concerning the application of a parole eligibility requirement).  The court of 
appeals noted “the factors relied upon in the deportation context apply with equal vigor to the cir-
cumstances of gross misadvice about parole eligibility.  Parole eligibility involves a foreseeable, 
material consequence of the guilty plea that is ‘intimately related to the criminal process’ and is an 
‘automatic result’ following certain criminal convictions.”  Id. at 5-6 (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 
at 1478, 1486). 
257. Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090, 1094-95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010). 
258. 619 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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relief, alleging his attorney “misadvised him by informing him, prior to his 
plea, that he could not face involuntary civil commitment under Florida 
law . . . .”264  The motion was summarily denied and upheld on appeal 
without opinion.265 
Bauder then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court in 
2006, alleging his counsel was ineffective due to his erroneous advice.266  
The district court denied the petition because it construed Bauder’s claim as 
one alleging Bauder’s counsel merely remained silent on the issue of civil 
commitment.267  Bauder appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed 
and remanded to the district court to consider whether Bauder’s counsel 
provided affirmative misadvice rather than merely remained silent.268  After 
the matter was briefed, the magistrate judge recommended to the district 
court that Bauder’s petition be granted.269  The district court granted 
Bauder’s petition, and Florida appealed.270 
The State advanced two arguments on appeal:  that the district court 
erred in ruling Bauder’s counsel misadvised him and that the issue whether 
Bauder would be civilly committed was being litigated at the time Bauder 
entered his plea, leaving the law ambiguous.271  In affirming the habeas 
grant, the Eleventh Circuit held the district court’s factual findings that 
Bauder’s counsel affirmatively misadvised him were not clearly 
erroneous.272  In briefly addressing the State’s second claim, the Eleventh 
Circuit cited Padilla for the proposition that even if the law was unclear, 
Bauder’s counsel had the obligation to advise his client that “pending 
criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration [or collateral] 
consequences.”273  Stated differently, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
interpreted Padilla to encompass other collateral consequences like civil 
commitment.274 
 
264. Id.  Before Bauder was released from incarceration, Florida successfully sought to 
civilly commit him as a sexually violent predator beyond the incarceration imposed for his 
criminal offense.  Id. at 1273 n.2. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. 
267. See id. at 1273-74. 
268. Id. at 1274; see also Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr. of Fla., 333 F. App’x 422, 424 (11th Cir. 
2009) (per curiam) (unpublished table opinion) (vacating and remanding for consideration of the 
affirmative misadvice issue). 
269. Bauder, 619 F.3d at 1274. 
270. Id. 
271. See id. at 1274-75. 
272. Id. at 1274. 
273. Id. at 1275; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010). 
274. See Bauder, 619 F.3d at 1275. 
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b. Subsequent Use of No-Contest Plea in Civil Lawsuit 
In Wilson v. State,275 Wilson pled no-contest to an assault charge.  
Wilson asserted he pled only after being assured by his lawyer that the plea 
could not be used against him in a civil lawsuit.276  When the assault victim 
sued Wilson, the trial court ruled that his no-contest plea collaterally 
estopped him from contesting the elements of the assault case.277  Wilson 
sought post-conviction relief to withdraw his plea, claiming he received 
ineffective assistance due to his counsel’s misadvice.278  The trial court 
denied Wilson relief and dismissed his application.279  Wilson appealed, 
and the Alaska Court of Appeals favorably cited Padilla, noting its rea-
soning, if Wilson could prove the affirmative misadvice, would establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel.280 
c. Sexual Offender Registration Requirements 
In Taylor v. State,281 Taylor pled guilty to two counts of child moles-
tation.282  He later sought to withdraw his guilty pleas, alleging he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to inform 
him that he would be required to register as a sexual offender and parti-
cipate in a sex offender treatment program.283  The trial court held a hearing 
on Taylor’s motion where Taylor’s trial counsel testified he did not 
remember whether he had advised Taylor of the requirements to register as 
a sexual offender or the sex offender treatment program, but it was his 
normal practice to do so.284  The trial court denied Taylor’s motion, 
reasoning that even if it assumed the veracity of his claims, sex offender 
registration and the treatment program were collateral matters.285 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia extensively discussed 
Padilla.286  The court asserted Padilla’s holding relied on prevailing pro-
fesssional norms, the fact that immigration was intimately related to the 
criminal offense, and deportation was a “drastic measure.”287  The court 
 
275. 244 P.3d 535 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010). 




280. Id. at 538-39. 
281. 698 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). 




286. Id. at 387-89. 
287. Id. at 388. 
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also noted the penalty was “succinct, clear, and explicit.”288  Using the same 
factors discussed in Padilla, the court determined Taylor’s defense counsel 
had an affirmative duty to adequately inform Taylor of the sex offender 
registration requirements if he were to be convicted.289 
Georgia is not alone in determining the failure to provide accurate, 
competent advice concerning the requirement to register as a sexual 
offender may render counsel’s performance constitutionally deficient.  Like 
in Taylor, the Michigan Court of Appeals in People v. Fonville290 held that 
the failure to correctly advise a defendant of certain sex offender regis-
tration consequences results in the ineffective assistance of counsel.291  An 
appellate court in New Jersey also relied on Padilla in determining a trial 
court should not have dismissed a juvenile’s petition to withdraw his or her 
admissions of guilt without an evidentiary hearing when the juvenile 
claimed his counsel failed to adequately advise a him and his parents of the 
sex offender registration requirements.292 
d. Parole Eligibility/Truth in Sentencing Law 
Padilla’s reasoning has been applied to enhanced parole eligibility 
statutes.  In Pridham v. Commonwealth,293 the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
used the factors outlined in Padilla to determine that a lawyer’s misadvice 
concerning the application of a parole eligibility statute constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The court held “the factors relied upon in 
the deportation context apply with equal vigor to the circumstances of gross 
misadvice about parole eligibility.  Parole eligibility involves a foreseeable, 
material consequence of the guilty plea that is ‘intimately related to the 
criminal process’ and is an ‘automatic result’ following certain criminal 
convictions.”294  Consequently, the court determined Pridham’s counsel had 




289. See id. 
290. No. 294554, 2011 WL 222127 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2011). 
291. Fonville, 2011 WL 222127, at *13. 
292. In re C.P.H., No. FJ-03-1313-02, 2010 WL 2926541, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
July 23, 2010). 
293. No. 2008-CA-002190-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2010), http://apps.courts ky.gov/ 
supreme/sc_opinions.shtm.  
294. Pridham, No. 2008-CA-002190-MR, at 5-6 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 
1473, 1478, 1486 (2010)). 
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e. Forfeiture of Government Pension 
In Commonwealth v. Abraham,295 the defendant, a sixty-seven-year-old 
high school teacher, pled guilty to corruption of a minor and indecent 
assault for offering a student $300.00 to have sex with him and grabbing the 
student’s buttocks.296  After the incident was disclosed, Abraham was 
allowed to retire with his pension.297  Once he was convicted, however, he 
lost his vested pension rights under Pennsylvania’s Public Employee 
Pension Forfeiture Act.298 
Abraham filed a claim for post-conviction relief, claiming he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because his counsel did not tell 
him he would lose his pension.299  The trial court denied the motion without 
a hearing, determining the forfeiture was collateral to the criminal action.300  
Utilizing Padilla’s analytical framework on appeal, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court held  
“the loss of [Abraham’s] pension is related to the nature of the 
sentence and the application of the measure has a definite, 
immediate and automatic effect on the range of punishment.  As a 
result, the loss of pension rights is a direct consequence of the 
guilty plea and counsel was obliged to warn his client of the 
consequences of the plea.”301 
2. Cases Limiting Padilla to Immigration Consequences 
Not all cases have applied the Padilla outside of the immigration 
context.  In Brown v. Goodwin,302 Brown pled guilty to aggravated sexual 
assault.303  Before entering his plea, Brown acknowledged he would be 
required to serve eighty-five percent of his imposed sentence before he 
would be eligible for release.304  Brown was also informed by the senten-
cing court and the prosecutor at the plea hearing of the possibility of 
involuntary civil commitment as a sexually violent predator “if the court 
 
295. 996 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010). 
296. Abraham, 996 A.2d at 1091. 
297. Id.  Abraham pleaded guilty to indecent assault and the other charges were dismissed.  
Id. 
298. Id.; see also 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1311 (West 2009). 
299. Abraham, 996 A.2d at 1092. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. at 1095. 
302. No. 09-211, 2010 WL 1930574 (D.N.J. May 11, 2010).  
303. Brown, 2010 WL 1930574, at *4. 
304. Id. 
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finds, after a hearing, that [he is] a sexually violent predator . . . .”305  At 
sentencing, Brown further acknowledged he was subject to sex offender 
registration and DNA testing requirements.306  Finally, the sentencing judge 
asked Brown whether his attorney had explained everything in the plea 
agreement forms, to which Brown affirmatively responded.307 
After he was sentenced, Brown appealed.308  However, the appeal was 
withdrawn because Brown’s counsel felt as though the issues Brown 
wanted to raise were better addressed as post-conviction relief claims.309  
Brown subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming he 
received ineffective assistance in that he was not fully informed of the 
possibility of civil commitment as a sexually violent predator.310  The trial 
court rejected Brown’s claims and denied him relief, noting Brown was 
adequately informed of the possibility of civil commitment.311 
After being denied relief at the state trial and appellate levels, Brown 
sought habeas relief.312  The United States District Court of New Jersey 
stated it must afford state court factual findings considerable deference, and 
the factual findings will only be overcome by “clear and convincing 
evidence.”313  The court then denied Brown habeas relief, noting the “state 
courts . . . made, not unreasonably indeed, factual finding that [Brown] was 
adequately informed of the possibility of civil commitment at the 
conclusion of his penal sentence.  In contrast, [Brown] offers this Court no 
evidence whatsoever . . . , suggesting that this factual finding was 
erroneous.”314 
The district court, however, did not stop at simply determining 
Brown’s assertions were facially meritless.  Instead, in dictum, it discussed 
the applicability of Padilla to non-immigration consequences.315  The court 
reasoned that civil commitment as a sexually violent predator was different 
than deportation consequences because it involves an individualized asses-
sment of whether civil commitment is appropriate in a particular case.316  










313. Id. at *12. 
314. Id. 
315. Id. at *13.  
316. Id. 
          
2011] THE FAILING PROMISE OF PADILLA 131 
the penalty is not succinct, clear, or explicit, counsel does not have the 
constitutional duty to advise a client of unclear penalties. 
In a similar case, Maxwell v. Larkins,317 the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri declined to grant habeas relief to 
a defendant on the basis that his attorney did not inform him, prior to his 
pleas to felony sexual abuse, that he would be required to register as a sex 
offender, he would be required to complete sex offender treatment before 
his release from incarceration, and he may be civilly committed as a 
sexually violent predator.318  The court distinguished Maxwell’s claims 
from the deportation consequences discussed in Padilla.319  Specifically, 
sex offender registration was not punitive; therefore, it was not a “penalty” 
in the same sense as deportation.320  The court also distinguished sex 
offender registration on the basis that “[t]he registration requirements do 
not impose substantial physical or legal impediments upon a registrant’s 
ability to conduct his or her daily affairs.”321 
According to the court, the sex offender treatment program was also 
different from the deportation consequences at issue in Padilla.322  The 
court noted the treatment condition is simply a condition precedent to 
parole eligibility where the offender must admit his guilt and show 
remorse.323  For the same reason discussed in Brown v. Goodwin, the court 
determined civil commitment as a sexually violent predator is not an 
automatic result, which distinguishes it from deportation.324  Finally, the 
court asserted there are no clearly established guidelines or prevailing 
professional norms because there was no specific mention of sex offender 
registries or civil commitment procedures.325 
3. North Dakota Appears to Limit Padilla to  
Immigration Consequences 
As these cases demonstrate, Padilla’s reasoning can and has been 
applied outside of the immigration context when the consequence is severe, 
is enmeshed or closely related to the criminal case, and is a near-automatic 
result of the criminal case.  The question remains, however, how will North 
 
317. No. 4:08 CV 1896 DDN, 2010 WL 2680333 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2010). 
318. Maxwell, 2010 WL 2680333, at *1. 
319. Id. at **9-10. 
320. See id. 
321. Id. at *9 (quoting R.W. v. Sanders, 168 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Mo. 2005), a pre-Padilla case). 
322. Id. at *10. 
323. Id. 
324. Id. 
325. See id. 
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Dakota courts apply Padilla?  As discussed above, North Dakota has a long 
history of following the collateral consequences rule.326  Nevertheless, 
Padilla’s reasoning could, and I argue should, be applied to all reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of a criminal plea in North Dakota.  Specifically, 
North Dakota courts should apply Padilla’s reasoning to revisit counsel’s 
obligations to discuss the application of the parole eligibility requirement 
for certain violent offenses,327 the requirement to register as a sexual 
offender,328 and the inability to possess a firearm.329  While certainly not an 
exhaustive list, these consequences are severe, intimately related to the 
criminal case, readily ascertainable, and reasonably foreseeable.  Counsel 
should be advising his or her clients about these consequences in order for 
the client to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision about 
whether to plead guilty or go to trial.  Unfortunately, it appears as though 
courts in North Dakota will likely read Padilla in its narrowest sense, 
limiting its application only to immigration consequences. 
Since Padilla was issued, the North Dakota Supreme Court has had one 
opportunity to directly address its application beyond the immigration 
context.  In Interest of L.T.,330 a juvenile was charged with the delinquent 
acts of gross sexual imposition and ingestion of a controlled substance.331  
L.T. appeared and was represented by appointed counsel at his pretrial 
conference.332  His parents, however, were not separately represented.333 
At this pretrial hearing, the gross sexual imposition allegation was 
amended to a lower gradation of felony, which allowed him to avoid prose-
cution in adult court.334  After the amendment, L.T. admitted to the 
 
326. See discussion, supra accompanying notes 186-92. 
327. State v. Raulston, 2005 ND 212, ¶¶ 12-15, 707 N.W.2d 464, 468 (stating the eighty-five 
percent parole eligibility provision is collateral, and even when the court misinforms the defendant 
of the application of the rule, it is inconsequential to the voluntariness of the guilty plea and 
counsel’s alleged failure to advise defendant of the application of the eighty-five percent parole 
eligibility requirement is not ineffective assistance of counsel); see also State v. Magnuson, 1997 
ND 228, ¶ 21, 571 N.W.2d 642, 646 (stating the eighty-five percent parole eligibility provision is 
a collateral consequence); Houle v. State, 482 N.W.2d 24, 30 (N.D. 1992) (holding counsel need 
not inform defendant of the applicability of the eighty-five percent parole eligibility provision). 
328.  Davenport v. State, 2000 ND 218, ¶¶ 9-10, 620 N.W.2d 164, 166 (stating “sex offender 
registration . . . is a collateral consequence” for which there is no obligation to advise the 
defendant); State v. Burr, 1999 ND 143, ¶ 36, 598 N.W.2d 147, 158-59 (stating “sex offender 
registration . . . is a collateral consequence”). 
329. State v. Bucholz, 2006 ND 227, ¶ 15, 723 N.W.2d 534, 540 (stating a prohibition on the 
ability to possess a firearm under North Dakota Century Code section 62.1-02-01(2) is a collateral 
consequence of a felony conviction). 
330. 2011 ND 120, 798 N.W.2d 657. 
331. Interest of L.T., ¶ 2, 798 N.W.2d at 658. 
332. Id. ¶ 3, 798 N.W.2d at 658-59. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. 
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allegations.335  There was no discussion on the record about whether the 
amended offense would require L.T. to register as a sexual offender or an 
offender against children.336  The juvenile court ordered a disposition at a 
later date and directed L.T. to undergo a psychological and sexual behavior 
evaluation for purposes of potential registration as a sexual offender.337  At 
the dispositional hearing, L.T. and the juvenile’s parents were represented 
by counsel.338  The juvenile court determined registration as a sexual 
offender was mandatory and ordered L.T. to register as a sexual offender.339 
On appeal, B.T., L.T.’s father, argued the juvenile court erred by not 
informing him that L.T.’s admission to the gross sexual imposition 
allegation would result in mandatory registration as a sexual offender 
during the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding.340  Both parties extensively 
briefed the applicability of Padilla to advice regarding sex offender regis-
tration.341  Surprisingly, the court made no effort to cite, discuss, or analyze 
Padilla.342  In fact, despite the parties’ substantial briefing and argument, 
the North Dakota Supreme Court did not so much as cite Padilla in its 
unanimous opinion.  Instead, the court relied on pre-Padilla “collateral 
consequences” authority to quickly dismiss B.T.’s argument.343  The court 
held that a defendant must only be advised of the direct consequences of a 
guilty plea, not “collateral consequences” like sex offender registration.344  
 
335. Id. 
336. Brief for Appellant at 3-4, Interest of L.T., 2011 ND 120, 798 N.W.2d 657 (No. 
20100329), available at http://www.ndcourts.gov/_court/briefs/20100329.atb htm. 
337. Interest of L.T., ¶ 3, 798 N.W.2d at 658-59. 
338. Id. ¶ 4, 798 N.W.2d at 659. 
339. Id. 
340. Id. ¶ 20, 798 N.W.2d at 663. 
341. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 336, at 19-21; Brief for Appellee at 4-6, Interest of 
L.T., 2011 ND 120, 798 N.W.2d 657 (No. 20100329), available at http://www.ndcourts.gov/ 
_court/briefs/20100329.aeb htm; Reply Brief of Appellant at 2-4, Interest of L.T., 2011 ND 120, 
798 N.W.2d 657 (No. 20100329), available at http://www ndcourts.gov/_court/briefs/ 
20100329 ryb.htm. 
342. See generally Interest of L.T., 2011 ND 120, 798 N.W.2d 657. 
343. Id. ¶ 21, 798 N.W.2d at 663 (citing Davenport v. State, 2000 ND 218, ¶ 10, 620 N.W.2d 
164, 166; State v. Burr, 1999 ND 143, ¶ 36, 598 N.W.2d 147, 158-59). 
344. Id.  The court held: 
A defendant must be informed of all direct consequences of a guilty plea, but he need 
not be advised of collateral consequences.  We have previously held that registration 
as a sexual offender is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea:  The purpose of the 
registration requirement is protection of a legitimate public interest, which imposes a 
collateral consequence upon conviction, not added punishment.  Accordingly, the 
judicial referee was not required to inform L.T. of the registration requirement.  If the 
defendant himself is not required to be advised of the collateral consequences of an 
admission, then no such requirement exists for a parent of the defendant.  L.T. himself 
does not claim he was prejudiced by the referee’s initial confusion as to the 
registration requirement, and B.T. likewise cannot make out a credible claim on this 
issue. 
          
134 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:85 
The court reasoned that since there is no requirement to advise L.T. of sex 
offender registration, there was no requirement to advise L.T.’s father, B.T. 
of the registration consequence.345 
Likewise, Padilla’s applicability beyond immigration consequences 
has been raised and denied in the district court level at least once in North 
Dakota.346  In State v. Richardson,347 Richardson pled guilty to one count of 
class A misdemeanor indecent exposure.  The offense to which he pled 
guilty required Richardson to register as a sex offender unless he qualified 
for a narrow exception to the registration requirement.348  However, prior to 
sentencing, Richardson was not informed he would be subject to sex 
offender registration if he pled guilty to indecent exposure.349  The 
sentencing court also did not inform Richardson of the sex offender regis-
tration requirement, nor was the sex offender registration condition 
included in the criminal judgment or any appendix to the criminal 
judgment.350  After learning that Richardson was not informed of the regis-
tration requirement, the State moved the court to correct or modify 
Richardson’s sentence on his behalf.351 
While no additional moving papers were filed, the court treated the 
State’s motion on Richardson’s behalf as a request to reduce or modify a 
sentence under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b).352  
Alternatively, the court treated the request as a motion to vacate his 
sentence and order a presentence investigation report and as a motion to 
withdraw his plea under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.353  
Ultimately, the court determined the motion was not only untimely under 
Rule 35(b), but also that Rule 35(a) was inapplicable.354  Consequently, the 
 
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
345. Id. 
346. See Order Denying Motion to Amend Sentence, supra note 9, at 3 (declining any 
requirement of court or the defendant’s counsel to advise the defendant of the requirement to 
register as a sex offender). 
347. No. 09-2011-CR-00156 (N.D. Dist. Ct. July 18, 2011). 
348. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-12.1(1)(b) (Supp. 2011) (stating the offense of 
indecent exposure); see also id. § 12.1-32-15(2)(b) (requiring sex offender registration unless a 
certain exception to the registration requirement is met). 
349. See Rule 35 Motion at 1, Richardson, No. 09-2011-CR-00156 (N.D. Dist. Ct. June 1, 
2011). 
350. See generally Criminal Judgment and Commitment, Richardson, No. 09-2011-CR-
00156 (N.D. Dist. Ct. Feb. 17, 2011). 
351. See Rule 35 Motion, supra note 349, at 1. 
352. See Order Denying Motion to Amend Sentence, supra note 9, at 1 (describing 
Richardson’s requested relief). 
353. Id. 
354. Id. at 2. 
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court concluded it was without jurisdiction to amend or vacate the 
sentence.355 
The court then addressed relief under a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea356 by following the traditional collateral consequences mantra.357  
Specifically, the court noted Rule 11 sets forth the requirement for the court 
to address the direct consequences of a guilty plea, including the maximum 
and minimum penalties for the offense.358  The court, however, reasoned 
that the state supreme court in Davenport v. State359 had previously 
determined sex offender registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty 
plea.360  Despite Richardson’s best effort to convince the court that 
Padilla’s rationale should apply, the court found Padilla’s holding to be 
inapposite without analysis.361  The court further declined to follow the 
emerging case law from other jurisdictions requiring the defendant to be 
informed of sex offender registration requirements before entering a plea.362  
Because the court found the sex offender registration issue to be a collateral 
consequence, the court ruled there was no manifest injustice warranting 
withdrawal of Richardson’s plea.363 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Padilla, the United States Supreme Court formally recognized that 
the real implications of a criminal case on a particular defendant oftentimes 
far exceed just whether the defendant will go to jail or pay a fine.  Padilla 
requires constitutionally competent counsel to affirmatively and accurately 
advise a noncitizen client of clear immigration consequences.364  When 
immigration consequences are not clear, Padilla requires counsel to inform 
 
355. Id. 
356. Id. at 3. 
357. Id. 
358. Id.; see also N.D. R. CRIM. P. 11(a). 
359. 2000 ND 218, 620 N.W.2d 164. 
360. Davenport, ¶ 7, 620 N.W.2d at 166; Order Denying Motion to Amend Sentence, supra 
note 9, at 3.  But see N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(2) (Supp. 2011) (providing that “[t]he court 
shall require an individual to register by stating the requirement on the court records . . .”) 
(emphasis added).  Nevertheless, the North Dakota Supreme Court has essentially erased the 
explicit mandate of the legislature by concluding that sexual offender registration is a collateral 
consequence, which means trial courts need not inform the defendant of the registration 
requirement before the entry of the plea.  See, e.g., Davenport, ¶ 10, 620 N.W.2d at 166 (denying 
post-conviction relief petition requesting withdrawal of guilty plea because defendant was not 
informed of sex offender registration requirement before entry of plea); State v. Burr, 1999 ND 
143, ¶ 36, 598 N.W.2d 147, 158 (same). 
361. See Order Denying Motion to Amend Sentence, supra note 8, at 3. 
362. Id. 
363. Id. 
364. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010). 
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the noncitizen defendant that there may be adverse immigration 
consequences.365 
Courts around the country, however, are struggling with whether 
Padilla applies only to immigration consequences or whether it also applies 
to other enmeshed consequences of a criminal conviction.  Padilla’s 
holding has been applied in cases involving misadvice regarding civil com-
mitment as a sexually violent predator,366 misadvice concerning whether a 
no-contest plea would prohibit a subsequent challenge to the elements of 
the crime in a civil lawsuit arising from the criminal conduct,367 the failure 
to advise a defendant of the requirement to register as a sexual offender,368 
misadvice concerning the applicability of a parole eligibility requirement,369 
and the failure to advise the defendant of the automatic forfeiture of a 
teacher’s pension as a result of a guilty plea to a sex crime in the scope of 
his employment.370  In applying Padilla in these situations, some courts 
have determined Padilla requires counsel to affirmatively advise clients of 
these consequences.  Other courts have applied the traditional collateral 
consequences rule, reasoning Padilla applies only to immigration advice.  
To date, courts in North Dakota seem to fall within the latter category, 
limiting Padilla to immigration advice. 
Despite North Dakota courts’ reluctance to apply Padilla outside of the 
immigration context, there is no indication counsel should avoid discussing 
these matters with their clients.  The Sixth Amendment establishes a 
minimum standard of competency, not the ideal.  Under North Dakota’s 
rules of professional conduct, defense counsel has an affirmative obligation 
to provide competent representation to a client, including the possession of 
the requisite legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.371  Moreover, counsel has an 
 
365. Id. 
366. Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010).  But see Brown v. 
Goodwin, No. 09-211 , 2010 WL 1930574, at *13 (D.N.J. May 11, 2010) (declining to extend 
Padilla to advice concerning civil commitment as a sexually violent predator). 
367. Wilson v. State, 244 P.3d 535, 539 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010). 
368. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).  But see Maxwell v. 
Larkins, No. 4:08 CV 1896 DDN, 2010 WL 2680333, at *10 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2010) (declining to 
extend Padilla to sex offender registration). 
369. See generally Pridham v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-CA-002190-MR (Ky. Ct. App. 
Nov. 19, 2010), http://apps.courts ky.gov/supreme/sc_opinions.shtm (applying Padilla’s reasoning 
to gross misadvice concerning the application of a parole eligibility requirement).  The court of 
appeals noted “the factors relied upon in the deportation context apply with equal vigor to the 
circumstances of gross misadvice about parole eligibility.  Parole eligibility involves a 
foreseeable, material consequence of the guilty plea that is ‘intimately related to the criminal 
process’ and is an ‘automatic result’ following certain criminal convictions.”  Id. at 5-6 (quoting 
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478, 1486). 
370. Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090, 1094-95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010). 
371. N.D. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.1 (2010). 
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affirmative duty to “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the repre-
sentation.”372  The communication duty requires counsel to provide the 
client with sufficient information to participate intelligently in important 
decisions, especially decisions for which the client has exclusive authority 
like the decision whether to plead guilty or go to trial.373 
How can criminal defense counsel get closer to the ideal?  Some com-
mentators, including myself, have argued defense counsel needs to 
approach the criminal defense cases in a comprehensive, holistic manner.374  
Defense counsel should make an effort not only to focus on the X’s and O’s 
in the criminal defense playbook, but also to see the client as a person 
facing a critical juncture in their lives.  Counsel should make an effort to 
learn about the client’s wants, needs, and interests not just in terms of jail, 
probation, or fines.  After all, “[t]he list of collateral consequences has 
grown to include many that are life-altering and devastating to our 
clients.”375  To that end, and in the spirit of Padilla, counsel should 
research, investigate, and advise clients of all reasonably foreseeable conse-
quences of a guilty plea so the client can make informed decisions about 
how to handle his or her case.  Our clients deserve no less. 
 
372. Id. R. 1.4(b). 
373. See id. R 1.4(b) cmt. 1; see also id. at R. 1.2(a). 
374. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 252, at 61 (“Some in the legal defense community call the 
more comprehensive approach holistic, with front-line defenders needing to be aware of the full 
range of consequences facing their clients, and sometimes calling on other attorneys with 
expertise in immigration, housing, or other areas.”); see also Kyung M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon 
v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 367 (2004) (advocating for a holistic approach to indigent defense services); Michael 
Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral Consequences and Reentry 
into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067 (2004) (describing some efforts 
of public defense services to provide holistic representation). 
375. Walsh, supra note 252, at 61 (quoting Jusine Luongo, a supervising attorney for the 
Legal Aid Society of New York City and chair of the ABA Criminal Justice Section Task Force 
on Comprehensive Representation). 
